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The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug
Treatment and the Supreme Court:
Washington v. Harper
JEANNETTE BRIAN*
The makers of our Constitution... conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.
Justice Brandeis'
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 1990, the United States Supreme Court granted
patients in state mental institutions the constitutional right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs.' That right, announced by the
Court in Washington v. Harper,3 was grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and accorded patients a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic
medication.
The announcement of the Court's decision appeared to be good
news for the more than 343,000 individuals admitted to the inpatient
services of state-operated psychiatric hospitals nationwide. Their right
to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs was extensively litigated in
* J.D. Candidate, SUNY at Buffalo Law School, May 1992.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. The terms "antipsychotic," "psychotropic," and "neuroleptic" are used interchangeably to
refer to medication used to treat thought disorders such as schizophrenia. Amicus Curiae Brief of
the American Psychological Association in Support of Respondent at 2-3 n.1, Washington v.
Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599) [hereinafter Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n].
The major antipsychotic drugs include Haldol, Mellaril, Navane, Compazine, Prolixin, and
Thorazine. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington State Psychiatric
Association as Amici Curiae at 6 n.l, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599)
[hereinafter Brief of the American Psychiatric Ass'n].
3. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
4. In 1983, an estimated 343,774 individuals were admitted to state and county psychiatric hos-
pitals nationwide, as reported in the Amicus Curiae Brief of the New Jersey Department of the
Public Advocate at 12 n.6, Harper (No. 88-599) (citing a National Institute of Mental Health study,
titled State and County Mental Hospitals, United States, 1982-83 and 1983-84, National Institute of
Mental Health, DHHS Publication No. (ADM 86-1478) at 3 (1986)).
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the lower federal courts,' as well as in numerous state courts,6 in the
decade preceding the Supreme Court's Harper decision. With Harper, it
appeared that the highest court in the land gave institutionalized mental
patients a constitutional right to resist forcible injections7 of powerful
mind-altering drugs. This right is vitally important to such patients, be-
cause antipsychotic drugs have serious, debilitating and sometimes irre-
versible side effects.' However, the Supreme Court's Harper decision,
5. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243
(1990); Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1988); Walters v. Western State Hospital, 864
F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1988); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hospital, 827 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1214 (1985); Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1984); Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128
(W.D. Wis. 1985); R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Osgood v. District of
Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1983); United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977
(D.D.C. 1983); Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 960
(2d Cir. 1983); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okn, 478 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and re-
manded sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J.
1978), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1079), aff'd, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119
(1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
6. See, eg., In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987); Riese v. St. Mary's
Hospital & Medical Center, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Large v. Superior Court, 714
P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1986) (en bane); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Medina, 705
P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d
308 (Mass. 1983); Anderson v. Arizona, 663 P.2d 570 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); In re Guardianship of
Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981); In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980);
Goedecke v. State Dep't of Inst., 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979) (en bane).
7. "Involuntary medication [with antipsychotic drugs] is usually accomplished by restraining
the inmate while he is given an intra-muscular or subcutaneous injection with a hypodermic needle."
Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 3.
8. The benefits of antipsychotic drugs to acutely mentally ill patients are well documented. See
THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 395-400, 414-18 (Alfred G. Gilman et al. eds.,
6th ed. 1980). However, the adverse side effects which commonly accompany these medications are
equally well documented. See, eg., Dilip V. Jeste et al., The Biology and Experimental Treatment of
Tardive Dyskinesia and Other Related Movement Disorders, in 8 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHI-
ATRY 536, 537-39 (2d ed. 1986); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N TASK FORCE ON LATE NEURO-
LOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS, REPORT 18: TARDIVE DYSKINESIA (1980); Ross J.
Baldessarini, Clinical and Epidemiologic Aspects of Tardive Dyskinesia, 46:4 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 8
(1985); Gerard A. Addonizio et al., Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome" Review and Analysis of 115
Cases, 22 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1004 (1987).
Although there is sharp disagreement in the medical and mental health establishments about the
severity, duration, and frequency of adverse side effects caused by antipsychotic drugs, there is uni-
versal agreement that these drugs can cause debilitating side effects, some of which appear to be
irreversible and can even be fatal. The most disabling of these side effects are akathisia (repetitive,
irresistible tapping-type movements), dystonia (severe rigidity or spasms of the upper body, writhing
and grimacing), and neuroleptic malignant syndrome, a potentially fatal condition. Brief of the
American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 2.
The most widely discussed and studied side effect is tardive dyskinesia, a condition characterized
WASHINGTON v. HARPER
far from giving patients legal protection, actually exposed them to forci-
ble medication with little or no prospect of federal constitutional relief.
Although the Court gave patients the right to refuse antipsychotic drug
treatment, it emasculated that right by allowing hospital staff to override
nonconsenting patients, without a judicial hearing or review by an in-
dependent medical panel outside the hospital, leaving patients with only
the flimsiest of due process safeguards. Harper gave psychiatrists and
state mental hospital personnel virtually unfettered discretion in medi-
cating patients against their will.
This Note will examine the potential ramifications of the Court's
decision in Washington v. Harper.' Part I reviews the facts and the
Court's reasoning. Part II traces the development of forcible medication
law as it evolved in the lower federal courts during the decade preceding
Harper. In particular, it explores the three major legal issues which the
lower federal courts grappled with during this period of intense right-to-
refuse litigation: first, whether patients who have been involuntarily com-
mitted to state mental institutions have a presumption of legal compe-
tence to make medical decisions for themselves and, thus, have the right
to refuse unwanted treatment; secondly, whether the Supreme Court's
by bizarre, uncontrollable movements of the face (lip smacking, chewing, protruding tongue, grimac-
ing), and similar rhythmic involuntary movements of the trunk, arms, and legs. Brief of the Ameri-
can Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 7 (citing Jeste et al., supra at 537-38).
Tardive dyskinesia is particularly disturbing since it appears to be quite prevalent. See Daniel E.
Casey & Jes Gerlach, Tardive Dyskinesia: Management and New Treatment, in GUIDELINES FOR
THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS: A CLINICAL HANDBOOK 187 (Harvey C. Stancer et al. eds.,
1984) (reporting "the occurrence of TD in 20% to 40% of patients maintained on chronic neurolep-
tic treatment"); ALAN F. SCHATZBERG & JONATHON 0. COLE, MANUAL OF CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 101 (1986) (reporting rates of TD of 50-60% in chronically institutional-
ized patients). See also Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (D.N.J. 1979) (the court cited
estimates by the medical director of a New Jersey mental facility that 35% to 50% of the hospital's
patients had tardive dyskinesia).
Tardive dyskinesia is also irreversible in some two-thirds of those patients with the disease, even if
treatment is discontinued at onset. See Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 9
n.18 ("We estimate that in approximately one-third of these patients in whom neuroleptics are
stopped, TD will disappear. The remaining two-thirds of these patients will have persistent TD....
To date, there is no proven specific curative treatment for persistent TD." (quoting Jeste et al., supra
at 560)).
9. This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's Harper decision from a mental health law perspec-
tive; however, Harper also has ramifications as a prisoner rights case. For an analysis of Harper
from the latter viewpoint, see Laura Ryan, Note, Washington State Prison Procedure for the Forcible
Administration of Antipsychotic Medication to Prison Inmates Does Not Violate Due Process: Wash-
ington v. Harper, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1373 (1991); Project, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1988-1989, 78 GEO. L.J. 699, 1429,
1446 n.3503, 1449 nn.3514-15, 1451 n.3518 (1990).
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decision in an important 1982 case, Youngberg v. Romeo, 10 mandates
that courts defer to the professional judgments of psychiatrists in treating
nonconsenting patients with antipsychotic drugs; and, finally, what due
process is required if patients do have the right to refuse unwanted treat-
ment with antipsychotic drugs. Parts III, IV and V analyze the probable
impact of Harper in relation to the aforementioned issues, and Part VI
evaluates how narrow or wide the holding in Harper is likely to be
construed.
I. ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON . HARPER
A. Facts of the Case
Walter Harper was an inmate in a mental health unit of a Washing-
ton State prison. While there, he was injected with antipsychotic drugs
against his will.11 These forcible injections occurred despite the fact that
Harper had never been adjudged legally "incompetent" in a court pro-
ceeding, and disregarding the fact that he repeatedly expressed his objec-
tions to the injections to the prison hospital staff. 2
Before subjecting Harper to the injections, the prison hospital held a
hearing pursuant to prison policy. 3 This policy stipulated that a pris-
oner had to be afforded the opportunity of a pre-injection hearing in front
of a hospital committee consisting of a staff psychiatrist, psychologist,
and associate superintendent of the hospital center.
The prisoner was to be given twenty-four hours notice of the hear-
ing. He was permitted to be present at the hearing and was entitled to
introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses. Although he could not
be represented by an attorney, he could be assisted by a lay advisor ap-
pointed to him. 4 The prisoner could appeal the panel's decision to the
superintendent of the hospital; however, he could obtain judicial review
10. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
11. Harper voluntarily took antipsychotic drugs on and off for six years before involuntary
treatment began in 1982, by which time he had already exhibited two side effects of antipsychotic
drug treatment: dystonia (acute muscle rigidity or spasms of upper body, writhing and grimacing)
and akathisia (repetitive, tapping-type movements). Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1046-
47 n.8.
12. At the hospital hearing held prior to the involuntary injections, Harper testified: "Haldol
paral[y]zed my right side of my body.., you are burning me out of my life... you are burning me
out of my freedom." Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1046 n.4.
13. Special Offender Center (SOC) Policy 600.30, Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033.
14. According to the Harper Court:
The prisoner is introduced to, and may consult with, his appointed advisor at the com-
mencement of the hearing. Harper's advisor ... [was] a nurse practitioner from Wash-
ington State Reformatory [who] asked Harper three questions in the hearing.... The
[Vol. 40
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only by means of a personal restraint petition or extraordinary writ. The
prison policy further stipulated that the committee could override the
prisoner's refusal only if he suffered from a "mental disorder" and was
"gravely disabled," or if he posed a "likelihood of serious harm" to him-
self, to others, or to property."5
Harper appeared before the committee which, because it found that
he was a danger to others,16 approved the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs. Thereafter, subject to periodic r~view, 7 and over
his continuing objections, Harper was injected with antipsychotic drugs
for almost four years. In 1985, he filed suit in state court claiming that
the state's failure to provide him with a judicial hearing before forcibly
injecting him with antipsychotic drugs violated his due process liberty
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.1
other five advisors appointed for Harper never spoke in the hearings. All five were ap-
parently staff at the SOC....
Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1055 n.30.
15. Id. at 1033.
16. The dissent in Harper continually expressed skepticism at the prison staff's characterization
of Harper as dangerous. The dissent quoted from a report of a non-prison psychiatrist who treated
Harper when he was transferred from the Special Offender Center to another facility. The report
stated:
To this date, he has not exhibited behavior in the presence of any committee members or
custody staff that would qualify him under involuntary medication policy. He does have
a long history of recurrent difficulty and as best as we can tell SOC instituted the invol-
untary policy and continued it on the basis of past bad faith.
Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1054 n.27.
The report further stated that "the inmate[']s behavior during the committee hearing did not
meet the criteria for gravely disabled or self injurious behavior. Involuntary mcdication is continued
on the basis of potential violent behavior towards others which has been well documented in the
inmate's history." Id.
At least some of Harper's assaultive behavior was apparently attributable to his frustration at
being medicated against his will. One of Harper's therapist's reported that Harper indicated "he
[was] going to destroy unit property until the medications [were] stopped. He... recently destroyed
the inmates['] stereo as an example of this." Id. at 1051 n.18. Harper's irritable behavior may
actually have been made worse by the involuntary medications. His therapist reported, "[t]hough
Mr. Harper is focused on psychosomatic problems from neuroleptic medications as per the side
effects, the real problem may be that the psychosis is exacerbated by neuroleptic medications." Id. at
n.16.
17. SOC Policy 600.30 required that a three-person committee, composed of hospital staff, re-
view an inmate's case after the first seven days of treatment (later amended to fourteen days). Subse-
quently, the treating psychiatrist was required to prepare biweekly reports to the Medical Director
for up to six months; a new hearing was then required to assess the need for continued treatment.
Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1034 n.4.
18. See Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 360-61 n.1 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1988). At the trial court
level, Harper alleged that the state's involuntary medication policy violated the Equal Protection and
Free Speech clauses of the Constitution, as well as state tort law. The trial court dismissed Harper's
complaint.
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On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court agreed with
Harper, 9 holding that forcible medication of a legally competent, non-
consenting prisoner without a judicial hearing violated due process.20 In
addition, the court concluded that the "highly intrusive nature"21 of
treatment with antipsychotic drugs warranted greater procedural safe-
guards than were provided by the state's internal review by hospital staff.
Only a judicial hearing, where the inmate had the full panoply of adver-
sarial procedures and was represented by counsel, could adequately pro-
tect the substantial liberty interests at stake.22 The court also noted that
a prisoner had to be given reasonable notice and time to prepare for the
hearing.
23
The Washington court further held that, under the Due Process
Clause, the state could override a patient's refusal only if, at the judicial
hearing, it proved by "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence that the
administration of antipsychotic medication was both necessary and effec-
tive for furthering a compelling state interest.24 In the event that the
prisoner was found to be unable to understand the nature of the proceed-
ing, or that he was incompetent to make a medical decision for himself,
the judge would make a "substituted judgment" for the patient.25
B. Summary of the Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington State
Supreme Court,26 holding that, although Harper did have a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication with anti-
psychotic drugs, his interest was adequately protected by the state's
nonjudicial hearing. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, ad-
dressed both the substantive and procedural issues raised by the parties
in this case.
Beginning with the substantive issues, the majority asserted that
Harper "possesse[d] a significant liberty interest in avoiding the un-
wanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
19. Id. at 360-62.
20. For a thorough analysis of the Washington State Supreme Court's decision in Harper, see
Amanda E. Lee, Note, Protecting the Inmate's Right to Refuse Anti-Psychotic Drugs: Harper v. State,
64 WASH. L. REV. 459 (1989).
21. Harper v. State, 759 P.2d at 361-62.
22. Id. at 363-64.
23. Id. at 365.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 364.
26. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
[Vol. 40
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'27 Certain requirements had to
be met before the state could override the patient's right to avoid anti-
psychotic drug treatment. The state had to find that the prisoner had a
serious mental illness, that he was dangerous to himself or others, and
that the treatment was in his medical interest.28 Once these three pre-
conditions were met - a finding of serious mental illness, dangerousness,
and medical need - the prisoner could be medicated with antipsychotic
drugs against his will. The Court held that the state's policy met the
three requirements, and hence, passed constitutional muster.29
The Court next considered what procedural protections were neces-
sary to ensure that the decision to medicate against the prisoner's objec-
tions was made fairly and accurately. The primary point of disagreement
between Harper and the State was whether due process required a judi-
cial hearing.3" Thus, the crux of the procedural due process issue was -
who should decide: a court, as Harper urged, or hospital staff, as the
State argued.
The majority opted for a nonjudicial decisionmaker, stating that an
inmate's interests were adequately protected, and perhaps better served,
by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals
rather than a judge.31 The following rationale served to explain the
Court's preference for medical, rather than judicial, decisionmakers:
Although we acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychiatric di-
agnosis... we do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists
can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist us-
ing the traditional tools of medical science to an untrained judge or admin-
istrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing....
*.. The risks associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the most part
medical ones, best assessed by medical professionals.
32
Anticipating the Court's hostility to a judicial hearing, various amici
briefs proposed an alternative process, positing that if due process did not
require a judicial hearing, it certainly required review by an independent
medical decisionmaker. 3' For example, a decision could be rendered by
27. Id. at 1036.
28. Id. at 1039-40.
29. Id. at 1040.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1042.
32. Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-09 (1979)).
33. Harper argued that the internal panel lacked the necessary independence to render an im-
partial decision, and that such internal decisionmaking in other cases failed to stop the improper use
of antipsychotic drugs to control or discipline mentally ill patients. Brief of Respondent at 28,
Harper (No. 88-599). The Brief also noted that improper diagnosis of schizophrenia may be as high
1992]
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a psychiatrist from outside the institution or by a panel of outside medi-
cal and mental health experts.34 The Court rejected this alternative ap-
proach, stating that independence of the decisionmaker was satisfactorily
achieved by the prison's committee of internal staff decisionmakers, and
observing there was "no indication institutional biases affected or altered
the decision to medicate respondent against his will."35
as 40%, a statistic which further supports the contention that antipsychotic drugs are inappropri-
ately prescribed in many cases and that internal decisionmaking has not served as a check on mis-
diagnosis and mistreatment. Id. at 16 (citing Donald J. Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized
Mental Health Patients' Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107, 115 (1985)).
The American Psychological Association, in its amicus brief, argued that some psychiatrists, as a
rule, show a "persistent bias in favor of drugs," and that this bias was demonstrated in Harper's
treatment record: "The State and its amici reflect this bias by referring repeatedly to the existence of
two options: drug therapy or no therapy." Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2,
at 27.
Legal commentators also have noted the reliance on antipsychotic medications by the psychiatric
profession, to the virtual exclusion of all other alternative therapeutic measures. See Vicki Ander-
son, Comment, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: A Proposal for Legislative Consideration,
17 IND. L. REV. 1035, 1038-41 (1984); Thomas A. Bickers, Comment, Psychiatry With a Conscience:
A Survey of the Right to Control Psychotropic Medication and the Involuntarily Committed Mental
Patient, 54 TENN. L. REv. 85, 86-90 (1986); Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 461, 474-78 (1978). For the psychiatric
point of view in rebuttal, see generally 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 327-58 (1980) (articles by psychia-
trists about patients' right to refuse medication).
Judges, too, have given credence to plaintiffs' allegations that these medications are used by un-
derstaffed, underfunded mental institutions as an easy, inexpensive means of controlling incarcerated
populations. For case law documentation of indiscriminate forcible medication practices in state
mental hospitals, see Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1303 (D.N.J. 1979) and Davis v.
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926-27 (N.D. Ohio 1980). One court noted that a psychiatrist employed
by a state mental hospital testified, "he could not recall ever not administering psychotropic medica-
tion to patients [admitted to the facility]." Walters v. Western State Hospital, 864 F.2d 695, 699
(10th Cir. 1988).
Perhaps ironically, the American Psychological Association has recently explored the advisability
of allowing licensed psychologists to prescribe antipsychotic drugs. That, of course, does not neces-
sarily.change or affect the Association's position respecting the involuntary administration of such
drugs. See Opinion and Letters to the Editor, 22 APA MONITOR 3 (1991).
34. A New Jersey public advocate agency submitted an amicus brief in favor of the independent
psychiatrist model of review. Brief for the New Jersey Dep't of the Public Advocate as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 36-38, Harper (No. 88-599). The Brief described Nety Jersey's
experience with independent and internal review mechanisms, noting that in 1980 external review by
an independent psychiatrist resulted in discontinuation or reduction of 59% of antipsychotic mcdi-
cation dosages. Id. at 6, 36-38. After New Jersey resorted to an internal peer review system, that
percentage dropped to 2.47% of cases. Id.
In its amicus brief, the American Psychological Association argued for an interdisciplinary expert
panel: "This body should include professionals who are not employees of the prison, and who repre-
sent a variety of disciplines (e.g., psychologists, psychiatrists, psychiatric social workers, internists
and others) whose views concerning antipsychotic medication may balance one another." Brief of
the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 29.
35. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1043.
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Finally, Harper suggested a third due process deficiency: if a patient
was not entitled to a judge, or to independent professional review, then at
least he should be entitled to be represented by counsel at the internal
review hearing.3 6 The Court summarily dismissed this argument, stat-
ing: "[It] is less than crystal clear why lawyers must be available to iden-
tify possible errors in medical judgment.,
3 7
C. Summary of the Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun's two-paragraph concurrence is noteworthy for
two reasons. First, he made reference to the amici briefs submitted to the
Court by the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psy-
chological Association - briefs which were. in direct opposition to each
other.38 The opposing briefs dramatically illustrated that the mental
health community was deeply divided over the issue of forcible medica-
tion with antipsychotic drugs.3 9
Second, Justice Blackmun suggested that the controversy about for-
cible medication might be lessened if state mental institutions were re-
quired to formally commit patients who showed signs of significant
incompetency. However, most states already require a formal commit-
ment hearing before patients can be involuntarily confined to state
mental health institutions. Perhaps Justice Blackmun meant that states
should require courts to decide whether a patient is legally incompetent
as part of the involuntary commitment hearing. Although such a sugges-
tion essentially aligns Justice Blackmun with the dissent, he did not ex-
plain why he chose to concur with the majority opinion.
36. Id. at 1044.
37. Id. (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985)).
38. See Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2; Brief of the American Psycho-
logical Ass'n, supra note 2.
39. The two opposing sides in this dispute are emphatic in their positions. For instance, the
American Psychological Association states: "Because antipsychotic drugs have grave effects, inher-
ent potential for abuse, and an actual history of indiscriminate use by the psychiatric profession,
forcible administration of these drugs requires review by an independent decisionmaker in a manner
comporting with due process." Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 2,
Harper (No. 88-599).
The American Psychiatric Association endorses antipsychotic drug treatment with equal and op-
posite rigor: Antipsychotic medications "are the treatment of choice for large numbers of persons
suffering from the most severe forms of mental illness... [they are] widely accepted in the psychiat-
ric community as an extraordinarily effective treatment for both acute and chronic psychosis, partic-
ularly schizophrenia." Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 10-11.
1992]
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D. Summary of the Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, began his
dissenting opinion with a scathing rebuke of the majority, bringing them
to task for approving a "mock trial before an institutionally biased tribu-
nal."'  According to the dissent, the majority gave Harper a substantive
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication with antipsychotic
drugs, but then it virtually ignored that interest by discounting the severe
results of antipsychotic drug treatment.4 1 The dissent, unlike the major-
ity, was primarily concerned with the side effects of these drugs, ptrticu-
larly when their use entails a substantial risk of permanent injury and
premature death,42 and when they have a profound effect on a person's
thought processes. Therefore, forced administration of such drugs was a
deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.43 Be-
cause Harper had never been adjudged insane or incompetent, he had a
fundamental right to refuse treatment.'
Thus, the dissent agreed with Harper that a competent person in a
non-emergency situation had an absolute liberty interest in refusing anti-
psychotic medication. To buttress the dissent's analysis, Justice Stevens
pointed to a growing body of state court decisions which had similarly
required a judicial determination of incompetence before the state could
involuntarily medicate patients or prisoners with antipsychotic drugs.
45
The majority's three-pronged standard was inadequate, then, be-
40. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1045 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1045.
43. Id.
44. Id. at n.2.
45. Id. at 1055 n.31. States requiring such a determination of incompetency now include Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Riese v. St.
Mary's Hosp. & Med. Center, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1st Dist. 1987) (absent judicial determination of
incompetency, involuntary patient's informed consent required before treatment with antipsychotic
drugs); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985) (absent emergency situation that poses an
immediate threat of harm, antipsychotic medicine may be administered to a nonconsenting mentally
ill patient only after the trial court is satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is
incompetent); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (before a state may use itsparenspatriae
power as justification for forceful administration of mind-altering drugs, there must be a determina-
tion that the individual lacks the capacity to decide for himself; such a determination is a uniquely
judicial, not medical, function and should be made at a hearing); In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609
P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980) (involuntary treatment in non-emergency situations requires instigation of
judicial proceeding to have the patient declared legally incompetent and to appoint guardian to make
informed decision for the patient).
Other states, although not requiring a determination of incompetency, do require a judicial assess-
ment of the need for forcible medication at a formal hearing. See, e.g., In re Mental Commitment of
M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987) (a court must determine by clear, convincing evidence that prob-
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cause it failed to take into account the patient's legal competency. The
dissent further noted that, even if it were to accept the majority's stan-
dard, whereby a patient could be forcibly medicated so long as he was
mentally ill, dangerous, and medication was in his medical interest, the
prison policy itself failed to meet that standard.' The policy, by its own
terms, allowed for forcible medication without any finding of medical
benefit.47 In fact, it made no reference whatsoever to expected medical
benefit, authorizing instead long-term involuntary medication to any
mentally-ill prisoner who appeared to present a future risk to himself or
even to mere property.48 The state readily admitted that use of anti-
psychotic drugs provided a means of managing an unruly prison popula-
tion and preventing property damage.4 9
Justice Stevens concluded that the state's prison policy was constitu-
tionally deficient, because it "sweepingly sacrifice[d] the inmate's sub-
stantive liberty interest to refuse psychotropic drugs, regardless of his
medical interests, to institutional and administrative concerns."50 Anti-
psychotic drugs were prescribed not for medical purposes, but to control
or to discipline mentally-iU patients.
In its procedural analysis, the dissent criticized the State's policy for
its failure to have the treatment decision made or reviewed by an impar-
tial person or tribunal."1 The dissent asserted that any decision approv-
ing such drugs must be made by an independent professional concerned
not with institutional interests, but only with the individual's best inter-
ests. 2 The choice was not between "medical experts on the one hand
and judges on the other," but rather between "decisionmakers who are
biased and those who are not."
53
The decisionmakers in Harper's case had two conflicts of interest.
First, they were part of an in-house system that required colleagues to
able benefit from proposed treatment outweighs risk of harm); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139
(Minn. 1988).
46. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1048.
47. Id.
48. Id. "In order for involuntary medication to be approved, it must be demonstrated that the
inmate suffers from a mental disorder and as a result... constitutes a likelihood of serious harm to
himself or others... or a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon
the property of others.. ." (quoting Record at 1, Book 9, Policy 600.30, Harper (No. 88-599)).
49. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1049 n.12 (citing Petitioner's Brief at 17, 29).
50. Id. at 1049.
51. Id. at 1052.
52. Id.
53. Id. at n.20.
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review and possibly override the treatment decisions of one another. 4
Arguably, it is not uncommon for colleagues to avoid second-guessing
one another. Furthermore, although a treating physician was barred by
the prison policy from participating in the initial committee decision, he
could participate in all other periodic reviews to determine if forcible
treatment should continue." The prison policy thus allowed a treating
physician to participate in a review of his own decision. Secondly, the
panel members could not exercise independent professional medical judg-
ment because they were mandated by prison policy to be concerned not
only with the patient's medical interests, but also with the most conve-
nient means of controlling'the mentally disturbed prisoner. 6 The panel
had to take into account not only the patient's treatment needs but also
the institution's separate interest. Hence, none of the decisionmakers in
Harper's case could claim independence of professional medical
judgment.-
7
The dissent summed up its procedural analysis with the following
pithy assessment: "Institutional control infect[ed] the decisionmakers
and the entire procedure." 8 Referring once again to the growing body
of state court decisions which had invalidated similar internal review
procedures, the dissent concluded that the Washington State Supreme
Court was correct in holding that a judicial decisionmaker was required
to resolve the competing individual and state interest claims.59
E. Impact of Harper Decision
The following analysis advances the argument that the Supreme
Court had the opportunity in Harper to forge a compromise in the emo-
tionally charged issues surrounding forcible medication with anti-
psychotic drugs, but it chose instead to stake out an unnecessarily
extreme position.
Particularly with regard to the issue of whether a judicial hearing is
required by due process, the Court turned its back on the sensible, mid-
dle approach of having an independent professional review, either by a
psychiatrist from outside the institution or by an interdisciplinary panel
of mental health professionals.' Such an alternative form of review
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1053.
56. Id.
57. Id. at n.24.
58. Id. at 1055.
59. Id.
60. See discussion supra note 34.
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would have satisfied the majority's concern that judges are not ade-
quately trained to make medical decisions and, conversely, would have
allayed the dissent's concern about endemic institutional bias. It also
would have protected the interests of the parties involved in such dis-
putes, including non-consenting patients, mental health institutions and
the staffs and officials that run them, as well as the two segments of the
mental health establishment which have found themselves in bitter disa-
greement over forcible medication - the psychiatrists and the psycholo-
gists.61 Many lower courts in the 1980s attempted a thoughtful, balanced
approach to this issue.6" The significance of the Supreme Court's failure
to endorse a compromise position can only be fully understood in light of
the development of forcible medication law in the lower courts, particu-
larly the lower federal courts. An overview of this development follows.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORCIBLE MEDICATION
LAW IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
In 1978 and 1979, the United States District Courts for New Jersey
and Massachusetts, in two landmark decisions - Rogers v. Okin 63 and
Rennie v. Klein 6 - ruled that patients who have been involuntarily
committed to state mental institutions have a federal constitutional right
61. This may be an overstatement, given the longstanding resistance of the psychiatric profes-
sion to both informed consent by mentally ill patients and to any outside review of drug treatment
decisions. See Loren H. Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the
Interface, 35 EMORY L. J. 139, 143 (1986) ('[p]atient autonomy is something new for medicine and
psychiatry.... Information is given to patients largely to achieve their compliance, not to involve
the patient in decision making."). See also CHARLES LIDZ ET. AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY
OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY (1984).
However, a leading psychiatric apologist recently indicated that some sort of internal peer review
of treatment decisions may be acceptable to his profession:
where are substantial reasons to favor... independent review of the appropriateness of
care.... Placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a single clinician has often led to
unskillful and at times unfortunate use of medications. This is particularly true in some
of our public facilities, which historically have had difficulties recruiting and supporting
competent clinicians. Unfortunately, in some areas those problems continue today. If
we truly believe that committed patients have the right to receive adequate care -
whether we attribute the right to their Fourteenth Amendment interests or to some
other source - the independent review model... provides essential protection for that
right.
Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment With Antipsychotic Medications: Retrospect and
Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 418 (1988).
62. See cases cited supra notes 5-6.
63. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
64. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction de-
nied), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (complaint amended to add class action on behalf of all
patients hospitalized).
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to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. The two decisions gener-
ated enormous controversy in the mental health and legal establish-
ments6" because they conferred a right to mentally ill patients which
never existed before. 6 It had been a long-standing assumption of both
law and psychiatry that persons admitted involuntarily into mental insti-
tutions had no capacity to give informed consent or to participate mean-
ingfully in treatment decisions. Law and psychiatry assumed, as well,
that involuntary commitment was synonymous with involuntary treat-
ment, and that the state mechanism of involuntary commitment was
designed to provide mandatory care and treatment for those who could
not care for themselves.6" In addition, it was an incontrovertible fact
that the treatment of choice of the psychiatric profession was overwhelm-
ingly antipsychotic drug treatment.69
The Rogers and Rennie courts radically changed these assumptions.
Judge Tauro, in the Rogers opinion, reasoned that committed patients
were presumptively competent because the state's commitment proceed-
ings did not include findings of insanity or legal incompetency.70 There-
fore, patients had a privacy right71 under the Constitution to be let alone,
and they could only be forcibly treated with antipsychotic drugs after
being adjudged incompetent in a court hearing.72 If a patient was found
to be incompetent by the judge, the court would appoint a guardian to
make a substitute decision. 3 The requirement of a judicial hearing prior
65. See Roth, supra note 61, at 152 (author describes Rennie and Rogers as "blockbuster cases"
which ushered in a decade of controversy and bitter disagreement between the courts and the psychi-
atric profession). See also Anderson, supra note 33; Bickers, supra note 33.
66. Roth, supra note 61, at 144-46.
67. Id.; see also LIDZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 20-21.
68. For a concise treatment of the legal and psychiatric theories of involuntary commitment
before and after Rennie and Rogers, see Appelbaum, supra note 61. See also Steven Shobat, Com-
ment, Pathway Through the Psychotropic Jungle: The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs in Illinois,
18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 407, 437-39 (1985).
69. See, e g., Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 16 ("the use of available
antipsychotic agents continues to be the cornerstone of management of these serious and disabling
mental illnesses" (quoting Ross J. Baldessarini & Joseph F. Lipinski, Risks ofAntipsychotic Drugs
Overemphasized, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 588 (1981))); see also Brief for the American Psychiatric
Ass'n, supra note 2, at 10 ("Antipsychotic (neuroleptic) drugs remain the primary modality in the
treatment of an acute episode or an acute exacerbation of a schizophrenic illness." (quoting John M.
Kane, Treatment of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 133, 134 (1987))).
70. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361-64 (D. Mass. 1979).
71. Id. at 1365-67 (Judge Tauro based his holding in favor of the patients' right to refuse treat-
ment absent an emergency situation on a broad right of privacy, as well as a First Amendment right
to think and make treatment decisions free from the intrusion of mind-altering drugs).
72. Id. at 1361-62.
73. Id. at 1362-64.
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to forcible drugging could only be circumvented in a narrow emergency
situation, in which the patient could be involuntarily medicated for lim-
ited periods of time when he posed a substantial likelihood of physical
harm to himself or others.74
In Rennie," Judge Brotman, after citing extensive evidence of indis-
criminate use of antipsychotic drugs in New Jersey's mental hospitals,76
found that patients had a privacy right to refuse treatment with anti-
psychotic drugs. 7 7 However, he reasoned that due process did not re-
quire a judicial proceeding. Instead, fairness and accuracy would be
satisfied by an in-hospital review, at which an independent psychiatrist
from outside the institution would serve as judge.7" The patient would be
represented by a patient advocate.79 On appeal,"0 the Third Circuit af-
firmed Judge Brotman's finding of a substantive due process right to re-
fuse" but held that the state's in-house review procedures were sufficient.
These procedures allowed the patient's treatment team and the hospital
medical director to make the final decision to involuntarily medicate,
rather than requiring review by an outside, independent decisionmaker s2
Both cases went through extensive appeals,83 traveling all the way to
74. Id. at 1364-65. On appeal, the First Circuit expanded Judge Tauro's formulation of an
emergency to include significant "deterioration in the patient's mental health." Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650, 660 (1st Cir. 1980). The issue of what constitutes an emergency for purposes of forcible
medication has been hotly contested in the courts. Some courts have held, as Judge Tauro did in
Rogers, that an emergency situation arises only when the patient poses an immediate and substantial
threat of physical harm to himself or others. See, eg., People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985)
(an emergency poses immediate and substantial threat to the life or safety of the patient or others in
the hospital); In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980) (the state does not have the
right to forcibly administer psychotropic drugs in non-emergency situations under itsparenspatriae
power).
Other courts - including the Rogers circuit court and the New York Court of Appeals in Rivers
v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (1986) - have held that an emergency situation can also exist when the
patient poses non-imminent harm to himself in the form of deterioration in his mental health, a
situation which has been called a "psychiatric" emergency as distinct from an imminent physical
emergency. See 8 MENTAL & PHYs. DISAB. L. REP. 82, 83-85 (1984) for a discussion of the various
legal definitions of "emergency" in the forcible medication context.
75. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.NJ. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction de-
nied), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (complaint amended to add class action and temporary
injunctive relief granted).
76. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. at 1299-1303 (D.NJ. 1979).
77. Id. at 1307.
78. Id. at 1306-12.
79. Id. at 1311-12.
80. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 841-44.
82. Id. at 848-51.
83. For detailed accounts of the Rogers and Rennie rulings in the district and circuit courts, see
Shari Lynne Kahn, Comment, The Right to Adequate Treatment Versus the Right to Refuse Anti-
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the United States Supreme Court.84 The Supreme Court declined to re-
view the decisions on their merits; nevertheless, the Court's dictum in
Rogers was subsequently accepted as law by many federal circuit
courts: 5 "involuntarily committed mental patients do retain liberty in-
terests protected directly by the Constitution, and these interests are im-
plicated by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs."86
Rogers and Rennie set forth the basic premise that patients have a
constitutional right to refuse treatment. They also delineated three dis-
tinct approaches for deciding under what circumstances a patient could
be forcibly medicated. Rogers indicated such a decision, absent an emer-
gency situation, could only be made by a judge.8 7 Rennie, at the district
court level, held that nonjudicial review was constitutionally adequate
but must be made by an independent medical professional from outside
the institution; 8 Rennie, at the circuit court level, also called for nonju-
dicial decisionmaking but relaxed the standard further by allowing for
purely internal staff review. 9
Rogers and Rennie spawned a host of lawsuits in other federal90 and
state courts91 brought by institutionalized patients who had been forced
to take antipsychotic drugs. The overwhelming majority of these courts
followed the lead of Rennie and Rogers, granting mental patients a con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs, subject to
an emergency exception.92 Most courts held that the federal right to re-
fuse treatment was grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 93 and stressed that the liberty interest of the patient
was significant, because antipsychotic drugs carry a well established high
psychotic Drug Treatment: A Solution to the Dilemma of the Involuntarily Committed Psychiatric
Patient, 33 EMORY L.J. 441, 462-72 (1984); Shobat, supra note 68, at 419-24.
84. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
85. See cases cited supra notes 5-6 (after the Supreme Court's dictum in Rogers, virtually every
court held that patients had a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment).
86. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. at 299 n.16.
87. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361-62, 1371 (D. Mass. 1979).
88. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. at 1310 (D.N.J. 1979).
89. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 848-51 (3d Cir. 1981).
90. See cases cited supra note 5.
91. See cases cited supra note 6.
.92. See supra note 74, for legal definitions of what constitutes an emergency for forcible medica-
tion purposes.
93. For a discussion of the different constitutional theories advanced in early court decisions in




risk of severe and sometimes irreversible side effects.94
Despite a general trend throughout the 1980s toward according
mental patients a due process right to refuse, there was confusion and
lack of uniformity in courts' holdings. In particular, courts disagreed sig-
nificantly about who should make the decision to override a patient's
refusal. Some followed Rogers, insisting that the decision to medicate
involuntarily must be a judicial one.95 Other courts, following the dis-
trict court's approach in Rennie, held that the decision to override the
patient's wishes was primarily a medical one, but due process dictated
use of an outside professional decisionmaker.96 Still other courts97 held
that internal medical review constituted sufficient due process, following
the lead of the Rennie circuit court.
Likewise, the courts were divided on the related issue of compe-
tency/incompetency. This debate centered on the question: did men-
tally ill patients enjoy a presumption of competency which could only be
overridden by a judicial finding of incompetency? The reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit in U.S. v. Charters98 typified many court decisions of the
period: "[m]entally ill patients, though incapacitated for particular
purposes, can be competent to make decisions concerning their medical
care .... 99 However, some courts maintained the traditional notion
that commitment automatically meant incompetency and involuntary
treatment.1° °
A United States Supreme Court decision announced during this pe-
riod added still another issue for the courts to ponder. In Youngberg v.
94. See discussion supra note 8.
95. See discussion supra note 45.
96. A mixed internal/external review procedure was approved by a federal district court in
Texas in R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (decision to forcibly administer
psychotropic drugs within the treating physician's discretion for the first fourteen days; thereafter,
clinical director to determine whether forced medication was medically appropriate; treatment
would continue unless patient's ability to understand consequences of his refusal was not impaired
by his mental illness; in that case, a consulting psychiatrist, not employed by the Texas Department
of Mental Health, would be brought in to make an independent determination).
97. United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed, 729 F.2d
863 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (treatment could commence over patient's objection after consultation with
Patient Advocate and patient's family, and after completion of administrative review within the
hospital); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (due process does not require peer
review by professionals outside the State Department of Mental Health).
98. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), reh'g granted, 863 F.2d 302 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
99. Id. at 488.
100. One court held, "[ain involuntary commitment is a finding of incompetency with respect to
treatment decisions. Nonconsensual treatment is what involuntary commitment is all about." Sten-
svad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp 128, 131 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
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Romeo, 10 1 decided two years after the district court decisions in Rog-
ers10 2 and Rennie,103 the Supreme Court considered the due process
rights of an involuntarily committed mentally retarded individual, who
alleged that hospital administrators unconstitutionally deprived him of
his liberty by subjecting him to physical restraints." The Court held
that such a person had a liberty interest, grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in "freedom from unreasonable
restraints." 1
0 5
Although the Court accorded Romeo a due process right, it held
that this right only entitled him to an assurance that professional judg-
ment was exercised in making the decision to restrain him: "[T]he Con-
stitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional
judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to
specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have
been made." 106
The Court explained the rationale behind its "deference to profes-
sional judgment" standard as follows:
[W]e emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified professional .... [T]here certainly is no reason to think
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in mak-
ing such decisions. . . .For these reasons, the decision, if made by a pro-
fessional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.107
This standard gave treating physicians in state mental health institutions
sole discretion in overriding a patient's constitutional right to refuse
treatment. Further, it severely limited the scope of judicial review of
such a deprivation by mandating judicial deference to professional medi-
cal judgment. The Supreme Court strictly limited judicial scrutiny to the
determination of whether the physician was grossly negligent in re-
straining the patient. 10 Constitutional standards and inquiries were to
101. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
102. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d
650 (Ist Cir. 1980), 451 U.S. 906 (1981), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
103. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979),
104. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-16 (1982).
105. Id. at 321.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 322-23.
108. Id. at 314 (citing with approval the Third Circuit concurrence of Judge Seitz, who equated
the deference standard with the standards courts apply to medical malpractice claims).
[Vol. 40
WASHINGTON v. HARPER
be eschewed in favor of a narrow negligence inquiry. 9
Although Youngberg did not deal with the administration of anti-
psychotic drugs, it opened the possibility that its facts and standards
might be applied to right-to-refuse cases. Indeed, many federal courts
subsequently applied the Youngberg standard of "freedom from unrea-
sonable restraint" to antipsychotic drug cases."' One court wrote, "[i]f
incarcerated individuals retain a liberty interest in freedom from bodily
restraints of the kind in Romeo then afortiori they have a liberty interest
in freedom from physical and mental restraint of the kind potentially
imposed by antipsychotic drugs." '' Courts also addressed the question
whether the Youngberg "deference to professional judgment" standard
applied to antipsychotic drug refusal. If so, psychiatrists from within the
institution retained complete discretion regarding the decision to invol-
untarily medicate, and courts could only inquire after involuntary treat-
ment had already occurred whether professional judgment to medicate
was in fact exercised.
The federal courts were deeply divided on the appropriateness of
extending the "deference to professional judgment" test to drug refusal
cases. 12 A number of courts construed the Youngberg standard as being
applicable to forcible medication,113 holding that so long as professional
judgment was in fact exercised, the patient's right to refuse could be
overridden by his treating physician without prior judicial intervention
and without prior medical peer review.
109. For an insightful discussion of the clash of constitutional values and the negligence/mal-
practice underpinnings of the deference doctrine, see Patrick Wiseman, Deferring to the Judgment of
Mental Health and Related Professionals in Striking the Constitutional Balance Between Individual
Liberty and the Interests of the State, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 281 (1988).
110. See, eg., United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted in part,
vacated in part, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990); Dautremont v.
Broadlawns Hospital, 827 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.
1987), reh'g en banc, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214; Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d
823 (4th Cir. 1984).
111. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1393.
112. See infra notes 113-14.
113. See, eg., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d at 312 ("Fairly specific guidance has been
provided by the Supreme Court. The basic principle is that a legally institutionalized mental patient
is entitled to the exercise of 'professional judgment' by those who have the responsibility for making
medical decisions that affect his retained liberty interests."); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hospital,
827 F.2d at 300 (stating that "[t]he decisions to administer psychotherapeutic drugs against Dau-
tremont's will were made by professionals exercising their professional judgment" and further, that
"[Dautremont's] liberty [was] outweighed by... the professionals' reasonable judgment"); Johnson
v. Silvers, 742 F.2d at 825 ("Johnson, in order to prevail, must show that the.., defendant...
required him to take antipsychotic drugs without exercising professional judgment.").
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Other courts held that the facts in Youngberg were not controlling
in antipsychotic drug cases,' for a number of reasons. First, Romeo
was an incompetent, profoundly mentally retarded individual who was
never able to make informed consent treatment decisions for himself."II
By contrast, as many courts were increasingly finding, mentally ill pa-
tients were not necessarily incompetent and unable to make medical
treatment decisions. 11 6 Second, Romeo was restrained with temporary
arm restraints.1 1 7  Antipsychotic drugs, unlike arm restraints, could
cause permanent and severe harm, hence the liberty interests at stake
were much more significant and required greater protection than a defer-
ence standard could afford.
Third, deference to medical professionals was arguably more appro-
priate in Youngberg because the decision was more narrowly a medical
one. Treatment with antipsychotic drugs, by contrast, involved personal,
constitutionally implicated values. As one court stated: "the decision
whether forcibly to medicate ... is not exclusively a professional judg-
ment. Although there is certainly a component of medical knowledge
required, the decision also involves an evaluation of the personal risks
and benefits of undertaking the proposed course of treatment that goes
beyond medical expertise."1 18 The same court asserted that it was inap-
propriate to "mechanically adopt and apply the [Youngberg] formula...
outlined by the Supreme Court."'
1 9
Another court opinion articulated a more philosophical objection to
the application of the deference standard to drug refusal cases:
114. See, eg., United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d at 979 n.14 ("Certainly Youngberg does not
deal with this situation.., where the unmedicated inmate can function adequately within the gen-
eral inmate population and is a threat neither to himself or others. . ."); Walters v. Western State
Hospital, 864 F.2d 695, 697 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Absent an emergency, legally competent persons
involuntarily committed to mental facilities have the constitutional right to refuse treatment with
psychotropic medication .... 'This principle need not give way to medical judgment' ") (quoting In
re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980)); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d at 488 ("The re-
straints which had been applied to Romeo were temporary.... Antipsychotic drugs, on the other
hand, may well cause serious and irreversible injury in a significant percentage of cases."); Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1396 n.7 ("Romeo is distinguishable both because it involved temporary physi-
cal restraints rather than mental restraints with potentially long term effects, and because Romeo
had been certified as severely retarded and unable to care for himself....").
115. See, eg., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1396 n.7 ("Romeo is distinguishable ... because
Romeo had been certified as severely retarded and unable to care for himself...
116. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
117. See, eg., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d at 489 ("The restraints which had been ap-
plied to Romeo were temporary.... Antipsychotic drugs, on the other hand, may well cause serious
and irreversible injury in a significant percentage of cases.").
118. Id.
119. Id. at 490.
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The Youngberg proposition that there is "no reason to think judges or juries
are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making [treatment]
decisions" may not be reasonably disputed. Conversely, however, I do not
believe that there can be any quarrel with the proposition that those profes-
sionals are not better qualified than judges or juries in balancing delicate
constitutional rights and duties.
2 °
According to a leading psychiatric commentator, the various stan-
dards shaped by the district and circuit courts in Rogers and Rennie and
by the circuit courts following the Supreme Court decision in Youngberg,
set forth the essential conflict between law and medicine posed by right-
to-refuse cases:
Physicians ... object that judges now make medical decisions, while the
courts have ruled that these decisions involve a primacy of nonmedical fac-
tors .... [T]he law is now struggling to decide whether it is better social
policy to have judges make quasi-medical decisions or have doctors make
quasi-judicial ones. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is the same question that
was asked some twenty years ago concerning civil commitment when physi-
cians committed patients to psychiatric hospitals without judicial proce-
dures. The locus of inquiry has moved from the hospital door to the
treating room, but the conceptual problem remains the same.
12 1
Against this backdrop of numerous and conflicting federal court deci-
sions and approaches, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to review the Washington State Supreme Court decision in
Washington v. Harper. This case offered the Supreme Court the opportu-
nity to directly rule on the issue of forcible medication with antipsychotic
drugs and, perhaps, to resolve some of the key differences among the
lower courts.
III. DOES AN INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED PATIENT RETAIN A
PRESUMPTION OF LEGAL COMPETENCE AND THUS A
RIGHT TO REFUSE INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT
WITH ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS IN THE
ABSENCE OF AN EMERGENCY?
As explained in Part II of this Note, in the decade preceding the
Supreme Court's Harper decision, many lower federal and state courts
recognized that involuntarily committed patients were not necessarily
unable to make their own assessments regarding the risks associated with
120. In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987). Sullivan's influential dissent was quoted in subse-
quent federal court decisions, including United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d at 490 n.14.
121. Roth, supra note 61, at 150.
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antipsychotic drugs. 122 These courts determined mental patients were
presumptively competent and could be medicated against their will only
after a court had found them incompetent in a separate incompetency
hearing (separate from the initial commitment proceeding)., 3
The Supreme Court, in Harper, essentially ignored the question of
competency and incompetency and, hence, ignored the implications for
the right to refuse. The majority scarcely acknowledged that Harper had
not been adjudged insane or incompetent, despite the dissent's insistence
on the legal importane of this fact. 24 It thereby implicitly rejected the
principle that competent mental patients retained a legal right to refuse
treatment in non-emergency situations.
The Court's position will not invalidate previous federal and state
court decisions which allowed competent patients an absolute right to
refuse, so long as those decisions were based on state statutes or state
constitutions. 125 However, in terms of future impact, the ruling in
Harper seems to mandate that any .right to refuse which is grounded in a
patient's legal competency cannot be supported by the Due Process
Clause of the Federal Constitution, but instead must be grounded in state
law.
IV. DoEs THE SUPREME COURT'S "DEFERENCE TO PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT" STANDARD, AS ARTICULATED IN YOUNGBERG V. ROMEO,
APPLY TO RIGHT-TO-REFUSE CASES?
The answer to this much-debated issue is a resounding "yes." The
Supreme Court, in Harper, explicitly applied the "deference to profes-
sional judgment" standard to antipsychotic drug administration,126 dis-
pelling the notion that the dangerous and intrusive nature of these drugs
demanded greater legal protection than the deference standard afforded.
The issue of deference to professionals was unquestionably among the
most important aspects of the majority's holding, and the part most dam-
aging to mentally ill patients' right to refuse. Deference effectively nulli-
122. See text and quote accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
123. See Appelbaum, supra note 61; Shobat, supra note 68, at 437-39.
124. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1045 n.2 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
125. See id. at 1047 n.9 (listing decisions which have based the right to refuse on state statutes
or state constitutions). See also United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 977 n.1 1 (8th Cir. 1990)
(listing state courts which have based a right to refuse in nonemergency situations on state statutes
and/or state constitutions), reh'g granted in part, opinion vacated in part, United States v. Holmes,
900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, Watson v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 3243 (1990).
126. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042-43.
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fled the right to refuse because it rendered that right almost completely
unprotected against state intrusion.
The implications for patients who wish to refuse medication in the
future seem clear: under the Harper extension of the deference standard
to antipsychotic drug refusal, the patient's constitutional right to refuse
can be overruled by a medical professional, so long as that professional
can show he or she exercised so-called professional judgment. Since pro-
fessional judgment in the psychiatric profession is virtually synonymous
with antipsychotic drug treatment,127 there will likely be few situations
where patients will have the ability to effectively exercise their constitu-
tional right to refuse. Only when a psychiatrist is grossly negligent in
medicating a non-consenting patient will a patient have a legal basis for
judicial review.28
It is not clear why the Court chose to give constitutional protection
with one hand and essentially take it away with the other. One possible
explanation is that the Court was unduly preoccupied with the lack of
expertise of judges to decide medical matters. Though an understandable
concern, the Court failed to balance it against the countervailing argu-
ment that medical professionals lack legal expertise to make decisions
regarding "delicate constitutional rights and duties."
129
The Court did not consider the possibility of pursuing a middle
course between the extremes of active judicial intervention and unfet-
tered physician discretion. It rejected the compromise between these ex-
tremes suggested by the American Psychological Association in its
amicus curiae brief; namely, that forcible medication decisions should be
subject to review by an "unbiased administrative body, [made up of] mul-
tidisciplinary mental health professionals whose views concerning anti-
psychotic medication may balance one another."1 0 Such a compromise
would give patients the benefit of an impartial review without involving
judges or significantly hampering the exercise of professional judgment.
Independent multidisciplinary review was also a more appropriate
way to deal with the very real scientific disagreements about the benefits
and effects of antipsychotic drugs. The Court explained in Youngberg'
that courts must defer to medical decisions, because it was inappropriate
127. See generally supra notes 33-34, 39 & 69.
128. Wiseman, supra note 109, at 284.
129. In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting), vacated, In re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987).
130. Brief of the American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 2, at 28-29.
131. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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for judges to "specify which of several professionally acceptable choices
should have been made." ' 2 Yet, the effect of the Court's deference stan-
dard - and specifically its refusal to consider multidisciplinary peer re-
view - was to endorse the psychiatric community's notion of acceptable
treatment practices and to exclude differing views from the decisionmak-
ing process.
133
The Court, ironically, did what it warned the lower courts not to do
- that is, favor one medical school of thought over competing schools of
thought. Though the Supreme Court ostensibly intended to keep the law
out of the sphere of controversial medical judgments, it entered the medi-
cal fray and sided with the psychiatric profession in an area of scientific
uncertainty and nonconsensus. The Court should have heeded its own
admonitions and left the task of resolving competing scientific judgments
to professional bodies representing the breadth of opinion in the mental
health field.
There are other sound legal reasons why the deference standard
should not have been applied to antipsychotic drug refusal. The defer-
ence standard rests on the assumption that the liberty interest of a men-
tally ill patient in refusing antipsychotic drugs is a purely medical
interest, involving a purely medical decision, and requiring, therefore, a
purely medical decisionmaker. Given such a conceptualization, patient
consultation and consent is beside the point. This approach is a legally
outmoded view of the relationship between physician and patient and,
according to a growing number of courts, it is legally outmoded whether
or not the patient has a physical or a mental problem.13 4 It fundamen-
tally discounts the individual interests at stake and the nature of the deci-
sion to be made.
Although there is no question that the Harper deference standard
eliminated external review as a requirement of due process, it is plausible
that the Harper decision could be construed as requiring some sort of
internal review. The State of Washington provided Harper with an inter-
nal hearing conducted by a staff panel of medical and administrative per-
sonnel. Although the Supreme Court did not state explicitly that
internal review was necessary to satisfy due process (merely stating that
Washington's review procedures were "sufficient" to satisfy due pro-
132. Id. at 321 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980) (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring)).
133. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 98-99 and applicable quote in text.
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cess. 3 ), the implication was that some sort of administrative review pro-
cess was necessary to adequately protect the liberty interests of the
mentally ill.
If this is so, then the Harper decision may protect non-consenting
patients against forcible medication ordered unilaterally by a single prac-
titioner. Such a reading of Harper comports with those lower court opin-
ions which have required internal review.136 Even before the Harper
ruling, a prominent psychiatric commentator observed that forcible med-
ication decisions should always be subject to medical peer review before
being implemented:
Placing unbridled discretion in the hands of a single clinician has often led
to unskillful and at times unfortunate use of medication .... If we truly
believe that committed patients have the right to receive adequate care...
the independent review model ... provides essential protection for that
right. 
137
Although some sort of internal review is likely required by Harper, it is
not certain that such review is mandated, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's deference standard announced in Youngberg.1 38 There,
the Court repeatedly stated that single practitioners may make the deci-
sion to restrain and courts must defer so long as professional judgment
was exercised.1 39 Youngberg made single practitioners the sole arbiters
of their patients' constitutional liberty interests. In future litigation,
courts might be confronted with the argument that state mental health
institutions, under Youngberg, are not required to implement administra-
tive procedures for internal peer review. The opposition would use
Harper to argue that internal review procedures are necessary to comport
with due process and that the decision to forcibly medicate must be a
collective one.
V. WHAT PROCESS Is DUE?
The Supreme Court, in Harper, recognized that a patient-prisoner
had a due process right to refuse involuntary antipsychotic drug treat-
ment. Once having accorded that right, the Court had to consider what
135. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1042-44 (1990).
136. See cases cited supra note 97.
137. Appelbaum, supra note 61, at 418.
138. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
139. Id. at 322-23 ("we emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified profpsional.... The decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid...")
(emphasis added tb the word "a" to underscore the point that the court continually refers to a single
qualified professional as able to make a professional judgment).
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process was due. The Court struck down the Washington Supreme
Court's requirement of a full adversarial hearing and, instead, upheld the
state's procedures, which included twenty-four hours notice of the deci-
sion to forcibly medicate, no right to legal counsel, no need for a judicial
decisionmaker or external medical review, and no right to appeal in court
except by extraordinary writ.4°
Regardless of whether one agrees with the dissent that these proce-
dures amounted to a "mock trial," '141 the process approved by the Court
flowed logically and inevitably from the Court's standard of deference to
professional judgment, discussed in Part IV of this Note. However, in
the end, the Court's position is perhaps best understood not in terms of
its deference standard, but rather in terms of its concern for institutional
stability. There was an explicit reluctance on the part of the Court to
add to the burdens of underfunded, understaffed, and poorly staffed state
mental hospitals.142 Underlying this reluctance was an implicit assump-
tion that giving patients an option to go to court to protect their right to
refuse would unduly burden state mental institutions. The Court as-
sumed that guaranteeing due process through the adversarial court sys-
tem would have deleterious institutional results.
This assumption was challenged in an amicus curiae brief submitted
by the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court.143 The brief cited the "salutary" 1" experience
Massachusetts has had with the judicial model of forcible medication
decisionmaking during the past eleven years since the landmark federal
district court ruling in Rogers v. Okin.145
The impact of the Rogers decisions on the mental health system and on
people with mental illness in particular has been salutary. The rules of law
and the procedures established by the courts have insured that individual
rights are protected without seriously burdening the operation of the
mental health system. 146
140. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1033-34 (1990).
141. Id. at 1045.
142. Id. at 1042 ("Nor can we ignore the fact that requiring judicial hearings will divert scarce
prison resources, both money and the staff's time, from the care and treatment of mentally ill
inmates.").
143. Brief for the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee of the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court et al. as Amici Curiae at 16-18, Harper (No. 88-599) [hereinafter Brief of the Mental
Health Legal Advisors Committee].
144. Id. at 16.
145. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert granted, Okin v. Rogers, 451 U.S. 906 (1981), vacated, Mills
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
146. Brief of the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, supra note 143, at 16.
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The brief noted that many of the medical community's dire predictions
about the effects of judicial review had failed to materialize. These in-
cluded predictions that: i) judicial review would put mental hospital staff
and patients at greater risk of physical injury; ii) the relationship between
physician and patient would become adversarial; iii) refusing patients
would go without needed drug treatment, thereby prolonging their hospi-
tal stays; and, iv) the courts would be clogged with forcible medication
review proceedings.147 None of these undesirable consequences had, in
fact, occurred.
Thus, according to a state agency which had observed the impact of
the Rogers decision over a long period of time, neither the courts nor the
state's mental health system had been adversely affected by judicial re-
view. The Supreme Court's implicit assumption that due process should
be kept to a minimum when dealing with underfunded state mental insti-
tutions was not borne out by the experience of a state which had followed
the judicial approach.
Regardless of how the Court viewed the practical impact of judicial
involvement in forcible medication decisionmaking, it clearly rejected the
due process holding of Rogers.1 48 Harper was a corrective holding, put-
ting a halt to the Rogers line of due process decisions. Moreover, it
might have signaled the end to a decade of judicial activism in the federal
circuit and district courts in the area of forcible medication law. Patients
and their advocates sought relief in the federal courts and met with con-
siderable judicial sympathy. Harper made clear that minimum "inter-
nal" due process, along with deference to professional judgment, are all
the federal constitutional protection non-consenting claimants will re-
ceive from the courts. Patients seeking more due process will have to
base their claims on state constitutional or statutory grounds - not on
the Federal Constitution.
VI. WILL THE HOLDING IN HARPER EXTEND BEYOND PRISONERS
TO INCLUDE CIVILLY COMMITTED PATIENTS?
Walter Harper was a prisoner in a mental unit of a state prison hos-
pital. This fact raises the question whether the Supreme Court's holding
applies narrowly to mentally ill prisoners or whether its influence will
extend to involuntarily incarcerated mental patients in general.
147. Id. at 16-18.
148. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cerL granted, Okin v. Rogers 451 U.S. 906 (1981), vacated, Mills
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
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The language of Harper's holding was explicitly prisoner-oriented.
The Court stated that, "given the requirements of the prison environ-
ment, the Due Process Clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate
who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will,
if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the
inmate's medical interest."' 49 This holding was preceded by an extensive
discussion of the Court's long-established principle of deference to prison
officials.' 50 The Court concluded that here, as in its previous prison deci-
sions, 15 1 prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights "are
judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily
applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights."" 2
Further underscoring the uniqueness of the prison setting, the Court
added: "There are few cases in which the state's interest in combating
the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in
a prison environment, which, 'by definition,' is made up of persons with
'a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent,
conduct.' """5
Thus, the Court explicitly directed its ruling to prison populations
and stated that the constitutional protections accorded to this group were
less than would ordinarily be accorded to other similarly situated, non-
prison populations. The language and analysis of the Court seems, there-
fore, to lend strength to the assertion that Harper should be construed
narrowly to apply only to prison patients,5 4 and furthermore, that civilly
committed patients might expect greater due process protections than
those given to Harper. That expectation was raised in the Youngberg 155
opinion by Justice Powell, when he opined that civilly incarcerated pa-
tients could expect "more considerate treatment.., than criminals."'
5 6
A more plausible reading of Harper, however, is that its basic prem-
ises will apply with equal force to civilly committed patients as well as to
prisoners. As this Note has already discussed, the Supreme Court in
149. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1039-40 (1990).
150. Id. at 1038.
151. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)).
152. Id. (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
153. Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).
154. The Supreme Court recently remanded a notorious prisoner case, Perry v. Louisiana, 11l
S. Ct. 449 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 804 (1991), to the Louisiana district court for further
consideration in light of the Supreme Court's Harper ruling. The issue in Perry was whether Louisi-
ana may forcibly medicate a mentally insane inmate to make him mentally competent for execution.
155. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
156. Id. at 322.
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Harper adopted certain substantive and procedural standards (and re-
jected others) which had been fashioned by the lower federal courts.
These courts had not developed separate standards for civilly committed
patients and prisoners.157 The basic rights and procedures were essen-
tially the same for both populations. That situation was not altered by
the Harper decision; the Court's constitutional analysis was fully consis-
tent with forcible medication law as developed in the federal and state
courts for civilly committed patients.
The parties in Harper expressed the view that civilly committed pa-
tients were affected by the Washington Supreme Court's holding and
likewise would be affected by the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion. The State of Washington, for example, in its Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, asserted:
The Harper decision on its face deal[t] with the right of an incarcerated
felon to refuse medically prescribed antipsychotic medication. The decision
however [did] not by its terms limit the court's holding to that context...
[i]t is undeniable that persons who are not incarcerated felons have rights at
least coextensive with those of incarcerated felons. Thus, there is no doubt
that the court's decision applie[d] to civil committees .... 158
The Petition further stated, "the Washington State Supreme Court's de-
cision ... if it is relied upon by federal courts or other state courts...
will affect the administration of psychiatric care in every jail, prison, and
psychiatric treatment facility." '59
The American Psychiatric Association, in its amicus brief, also con-
tended that the state court holding in Harper went beyond prisoners and
would affect thousands of mentally ill persons involuntarily confined
under state civil commitment statutes." The Association viewed this
issue as having a significant impact on all persons confined for treatment
to mental institutions. 161
Of course, just because the parties to a dispute (or interested non-
parties) predict a broad construction of a holding it does not mean that
157. See, eg., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1317 (1990) (applying the [Youngberg] principle of deference to a prisoner, and stating that, "the
basic principle is that a legally institutionalized mental patient is entitled to the exercise of profes-
sional judgment." (emphasis added)). The court in Charters made no distinction between types of
institutionalized mental patients. It assumed that the deference standard applied equally to a pris-
oner and a civilly committed patient. Id.
158. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in the
Supreme Court of the United States at 6 n.6, Harper (No. 88-599).
159. Id. at 5-6.
160. Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 2, at 7.
161. Id. at 2.
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courts will accept such a construction. Yet, the substantive and proce-
dural rights outlined in Harper are likely to define the outer edges of
Federal Constitutional rights in the forcible medication area. Thus it
seems virtually assured that civilly committed patients will enjoy the
same substantive liberty interest as Harper. The Court suggested, in its
widely heralded dictum in the Rogers case, that a civilly committed pa-
tient had a Fourteenth Amendment right of refusal. 62 Harper confirmed
that right and extended it to a prisoner. The controversial aspect of the
majority's ruling was its procedural holding, and the question left in its
wake is whether civilly committed patients will enjoy greater procedural
protections than the minimum process accorded to Harper. The Court,
first in Youngberg' 6 and again in Harper, emphatically and repeatedly
expressed its hostility toward judicial participation in medical decision-
making, both in a civil commitment context and a prisoner context. Al-
most inevitably, the basic model of nonjudicial internal decisionmaking
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Harper will be applied in the civil
commitment context. This does not mean that courts will follow
Harper's procedures to the letter. The notice given to Harper prior to the
internal hearing (just twenty-four hours) would seem to be narrowly tai-
lored to the punitive prison environment and inappropriate to the goals
of civil commitment. However, even though the details of procedural due
process may vary and expand in the civil area, the basic nonjudicial
model of forcible medication decisionmaking appears mandated by
Harper for all mentally ill patients.
Likewise, the model of judicial deference to professional judgment is
likely to be applied to all mentally ill patients. The deference standard
was first articulated in a civil commitment context; the Court's repudia-
tion of judicial participation in medical matters in Youngberg1 and
Harper, strongly indicates that deference is a pervasive standard and
should be applied universally, whether the refuser is a prisoner or a
civilly committed patient.
CONCLUSION
Several years before the Supreme Court's decision in Harper, a
noted psychiatrist assessed the Court's Youngberg deference standard
and subsequent developments and made the following prediction:
162. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 n.16 (1982).




[l]t is very unlikely that resort to ftll judicial hearings to adjudicate the
patient's right to refuse will take place in many states. The ball has been
returned to psychiatry, departments of mental health, and institutional per-
sonnel to assure the patient's rights.
165
In large measure, that prediction was correct. When the Supreme Court
announced its standard of deference to professional judgment in
Youngberg, judges, lawyers and psychiatrists were all put on notice that
the Court was opposed to judicial intervention in medical treatment deci-
sions for patients in mental institutions.
The ruling in Harper sends a clear message that judges should not
become involved in treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic drugs,
except on appeal after medical professionals have made the decision to
medicate (and probably already implemented the decision). Even then,
judges are only to decide the narrow question of whether the decision
was made by a professional exercising appropriate judgment. Thus, judi-
cial review is strictly limited to a negligence inquiry.
Such a standard does, indeed, return the ball to the psychiatric
court. However, that is not necessarily the end of the match. The com-
mentator quoted above was not completely correct in predicting that
most state courts would follow the lead of the Supreme Court by leaving
the decision to forcibly medicate entirely to employees of state mental
institutions. It is true that many federal courts felt obligated, following
the Youngberg decision, to apply the deference standard to antipsychotic
drug refusal.166 Some state courts, however, applying state law, rejected
the deference standard and gave nondangerous patients judicial protec-
tion for a right to refuse.16 7 The New York Court of Appeals and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, supplanted the more deferential
decisions of federal courts in their states with strong judicial protections
for drug refusers, based in state law.168
The Harper decision is not likely to stop these states or others from
carving out a more active judicial role in this controversial area. The
Supreme Court itself has long held that state law can recognize liberty
interests more extensive than those protected by the Federal Constitution
165. Roth, supra note 61, at 157.
166. See cases cited supra note 113.
167. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (where the New York Court of Appeals
supplanted the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960
(2nd Cir. 1983)). See also State ex rel Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987) (sup-
planting the decision of the federal district court in Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Wis.
1985)).
168. See cases cited supra note 167.
1992]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
and can confer procedural protections that extend beyond those mini-
mally required by the Federal Constitution.169 This is precisely the situa-
tion here. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated an unwillingness to
extend more than minimum due process to patients who refuse anti-
psychotic medication. The Court has left it to the states to apply state
law in giving patients more due process. The Harper decision shouts
what Youngberg whispered: that states shall henceforth be the arena for
any further significant developments that may occur in this area of the
law, and state law is to be the vehicle for any extension of due process
beyond the meager dole given out by the Supreme Court in Harper.
Harper points claimants to the state court door and steers them
away from federal courts. That should not deter patients and their advo-
cates. States as diverse as New York, Oklahoma, California, Colorado,
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin have seen fit to give incarcerated patients
significant due process protections in their courts. 170 State courts and
state legislatures elsewhere may be persuaded that mentally ill patients
should not be subjected to potentially harmful medications against their
will without significant protections against potential abuse. These states
may conclude, as their sister states have, that such legal protections offer
a humane and workable solution to a divisive problem.
169. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1981) ("State law may recognize liberty inter-
ests more extensive than those independently protected by the Federal Constitution.") (citing Green-
holtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 12 (1979)).
170. See cases cited and discussion supra note 45.
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